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Abstract 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the silence of an 
assassin was taken as a sign of bitterness, brooding, and anger. 
In this paper, I want to examine the construction of the McKinley 
assassination by looking less at the assassin, Leon Czolgosz, and 
more at how the social and medical sciences at the turn of the 
century derived meaning out of Czolgosz’s silences, his words, 
and his body. In particular, I want to understand how the social 
and medical sciences created a discourse – a set of rules and 
practices, an articulation of the expectations, representations, 
and background of danger – out of the assassination that had 
implications for criminal justice in the twentieth century.
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You may strangle this voice, but my silence will be more terrible 
than speech. 
Michael J. Schaack, Anarchy and Anarchists: A History of the Red 
Terror and the Social Revolution in American and Europe.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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Slightly after four o’clock on the afternoon of September 
6
th, 1901, at the Pan-American Exhibition in Buffalo, New York, 
Leon Czolgosz shot President William McKinley. McKinley died of 
gangrene poisoning on September 14, 1901. Following a two-
day trial, Czolgosz was executed on October 29, 1901.
THE DISCOURSE OF SILENCE EXPLAINED
By the end of the nineteenth century, a discourse 
appeared that sought to reveal the truth about behavior through 
an examination of the abnormal individual, or what Michel 
Foucault called “the individual to be corrected” (2003: xvii). A 
discourse can be defined as a system of thoughts “composed of 
ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and practices that 
systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which 
they speak" (Lessa, 2006: 285). Crime can be defined as “an 
intentional act in violation of the criminal law (statutory or case 
law) committed without defense or excuse, and penalized by the 
state as a felony or misdemeanor” (Tappan, 1947: 100). But 
crime can also be seen as part of the discourse of dangerousness 
that was emerging during the nineteenth century (Bonger, 1916; 
Arthur MacDonald, 1902a). Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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century, crime was no longer seen from the singular perspective 
of a violation of the law. It was functioning within a “discursive 
practice” (Foucault, 1972: 164) of the new “political anatomy” 
(Foucault, 1979: 208-09) that bore down on bodies, in an effort 
to normalize the deviant. Crime, rather than a deviation from the 
law, is a sign of some kind of deviance, and thus subject to a 
“series of descriptive statements” (Foucault, 1972: 33) about the 
character of the criminal. So the question of crime is no longer 
strictly a legal one – “What is this act?” – but a governmental 
and epistemological one: “How can we assign the causal process 
that produced it?” (Foucault, 1979: 19; italics in original). From 
where did this discourse of the dangerous individual arise?
Marie-Christine Leps has noted that narratives played an 
important role in the development of scientific discourse in the 
nineteenth century, “for they intervened whenever dogmatic or 
enthymematical discourse could no longer reason what had to be 
demonstrated: at that moment, short stories would take over 
and function as the direct manifestation of reality” (Leps, 1992: 
56; italics in original). The discourse of the dangerous individual 
arose out of the space that existed within the then-dominant, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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but slowly dying law-based narrative, derived from the Italian 
philosopher Cesare Beccaria’s 1764 treatise, On Crimes and 
Punishment, which focused on the violation of the law as the 
definition of criminality. As Leps suggests, that discourse fell 
apart because it could no longer account for the presence of 
those who, seemingly with conscious intent, broke the law but 
claimed other, unseen motives were at work (Report of the Trial 
of Abraham Prescott, 1869). Something, in other words, lay 
“hidden behind the body wall, beneath the morphological sphinx” 
(Saldana, 1933: 333).
To explain what was hidden within subjectivity required 
restructuring the language of criminal justice, without 
abandoning the key concepts of modern criminal justice. 
Responsibility had to maintain its hold on the individual, even in 
the face of disease. Punishment had to be rooted in the 
administration of justice and not vengeance. To reconstruct the 
meaning of violence in light of medical breakthroughs and the 
rise of the dangerous classes, the criminal’s story would have to
begin at the end, with the event, and the explanation of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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motive would have to flow backward, toward a type. A new 
discourse was necessary, one starting “at the end of the story,”
but “which is there from the beginning, transforming events into 
indicia of their finality, their making sense in terms of their 
outcome” (Brooks, 1996: 19).
The McKinley assassination is not a legal text, subject to 
textual analyses. But it contains documents – a trial record, 
published and unpublished confessions, commentary by legal 
and medical writers – that provide the researcher with the keys 
to understand the emergence of power and knowledge at the 
end of the century. In this paper, then, I describe the historical 
understanding and a theory of silence, as well as an analytic of 
power. By theorizing silence, I mean to provide an overall 
theoretical understanding of the tradition by which silence 
implied guilt. But as I make clear in the second half of this 
paper, Czolgosz’s silence is not the preserve of the legal 
profession. His body was analyzed for its true meaning, a 
meaning not given by Czolgosz in words. Silence, then, belongs 
to no one idea or theoretical construct. To theorize silence would 
be to universalize silence. But the McKinley assassination Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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represents a new beginning for the meaning of silence. Silence 
belongs, following Foucault, to the analytics of power, to an 
attempt to refrain from theorizing about what silence was at the 
turn of the century, and to concentrate the reader’s attention on 
the discursive powers that made Czolgosz’s silence, speech, and 
body parts mean more than they had been just twenty years 
earlier. My point is to get the reader to see how the power of 
silence operates in a particular historical epoch and in a given 
context. To begin to understand the McKinley assassination with 
a focus on an assassin’s silence as already ensconced within a 
discourse of dangerousness, then, is to shine a light on how that 
new discourse had, before the century ended, already taken into 
account the danger that lurked within Czolgosz (Foucault, 1988: 
126-127).
At the end of the nineteenth century, silence had broken 
free from its strictly legal meaning and was linked with the 
medical gaze. Speech, or the lack thereof, was now equated with 
neurological and psychological disorders (Collins, 1907; Bastian, 
1898). Silence became something larger than a legal strategy. 
To be sure, silence has been part of the discourse of danger for Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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some time, but that discourse has largely been framed by legal 
language: silence hides motive, shields associates (Langbein, 
2006). The end of the nineteenth century undermined the status 
of the legal profession’s equation of silence with guilt. Silence 
now hid unclean thoughts, moral and political perversions 
(Peterson and Haines, 1903, vol. I: 688). The subject’s silence, 
along with things said, his background, mental condition and 
physical abnormalities found itself imprinted within the language 
of atavism, dangerousness, and degeneration (Pick, 1989).
But by making silence part of the discourse of deviance 
and dangerousness, rather than a strictly legal entity that 
implicates guilt, there was an acknowledgement, on behalf of the 
legal community, that there had been an alteration in the way 
courts perceive guilt; that more not less was needed from the 
defendant. The medicalized discourse of silence operates 
beneath the language of rights, seeking to extricate the precise 
point of danger lodged in the body. The importance of the law 
diminishes. But at the same time, it reinvigorates itself by 
forcing the defendant to speak, to explain his crime, his 
motivation, and his reason for snuffing out a life. Together, the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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late nineteenth-century medico-juridico discourse produces the 
dangerous subject. Discourse, then, the effusion of language 
that erupts out of the space that exists between words and 
things, that produces knowledge of these gaps, represents a will 
to truth, an effort made to identify and order the signs and 
symbols of an era that are in need of new representations or 
meanings.
Czolgosz’s “silence” is a complex discursive event. It needs 
to be understood in the context of the medico-juridical discourse 
of dangerousness that was prevalent during the turn of the 
century. He did speak. But his words were either taken to have 
multiple meanings or they were ignored. Into this breach, his 
body spoke. As I describe later in this article, Czolgosz’s body, in 
life and death, revealed the source of his motive as much as 
anything said or unsaid. Czolgosz’s body and his silence were 
understood as possessing dangerousness because his 
associations were understood as dangerous; because his vague 
utterances about McKinley and the poor were understood as 
dangerous; because his background as a Pole and a factory 
worker were considered dangerous. Once classified as such, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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nothing about him was innocent or mitigating (Lombroso, 1891). 
His silence, then, was taken both metaphorically and materially 
as a manifestation of his embodied dangerousness, as part of his 
innate guilt.
The purpose of this article is to reveal the new 
criminological discourse, understood here as part of “relations of 
force” (Foucault, 1980: 114), rather than to explore the hidden 
semiological meaning of legal silence. In reconstructing an 
assassin’s motive, we are in the realm of power, of observations 
of the body and exertions against the deviants, and not within 
the mire of linguistic differences, because the discovery of the 
assassin’s inherent dangerousness was never part of a formal 
scheme of “language and dialogue.” Rather it belonged, from its 
very inception, that is, from the minute Czolgosz was heard to 
exclaim, after shooting McKinley, “I done my duty,” to the 
“hazardous reality of conflict” (Foucault, 1980: 115).
To unearth this warlike discourse over silence at the time 
of the assassination, I want to stress that I see Czolgosz’s 
silence (and the effusion of discourses about Czolgosz’s deed) as 
part of what Foucault calls “power/knowledge.” The confluence Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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of the “deployment of force and the establishment of truth” 
(Foucault, 1979: 184) about the subject, in this view, renders 
Czolgosz’s silence part of something larger: a “discursive 
formation” (Foucault, 1994: xi) of what it meant, at the turn of 
the century, to look dangerous and to be dangerous.
After giving a brief reason for killing McKinley – “I shot the 
president because he was the enemy of the people, the good 
working people,” and “I killed President McKinley because I done 
my duty. I didn’t believe one man should have so much service 
and another man should have none” (Briggs, 1983 [1921]: 251) 
– Czolgosz remained mostly silent for the greater part of his time 
in prison and in court. What do I mean by silence when Czolgosz 
certainly spoke?
By silence, I mean more than silence itself and more than 
the right to silence, the right against self incrimination. The right 
to silence refers to the “common law principle” that a court 
“should not be invited or encouraged to conclude…that a 
defendant is guilty merely because he has refused to respond to 
allegations…or has refused to testify in court in his own defence” 
(Greer, 1990: 710). Although there are many ways to examine Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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the problem of law and language, and the right to silence in 
particular (Tiersma, 2000; Brooks, 2000; Conley, 2005; 
Milovanovic, 2007; Wegner, 2010), my approach relies on a 
historical and discursive reading of silence as it emerged out of 
the late nineteenth century’s battles over the problem of the 
subject, governance, disciplinary boundaries, and population 
control – in short, I see the meaning of Czolgosz’s silence 
through the battles over the construction of the subject at the 
end of the nineteenth century involving questions of power that 
accompanied that construction (Foucault, 1979: part 3), and not 
as a legal struggle to establish a constitutional right to silence. 
The attempt here is not so formal. To emphasize a discursive 
silence, a coded silence, I cannot stress the meaning of the 
assassination over the construction of the subject. To do so 
would be to favor the objects and signs that constitute the 
assassination’s meaning over the birth of the management of 
subjects and populations, and that, I find, in this context, would 
be ahistorical. The former view is too formal to fully express the 
role that power plays in discourse formations. It would require,
in my view, ignoring how Czolgosz was constructed by discourse Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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as a dangerous anarchist at a point in time. In Nathan Moore’s 
terms, if the sign is linked with the subject, then the 
methodology is Foucault’s; if linked with the event, then it 
belongs to the Deleuze of signs (Moore, 2007: 34).
There is a correlation between the understanding of silence 
(a “discursive formation”) in criminal trials at the end of the 
century and a pronounced effort to link silence with political 
practices then in operation (“non-discursive domains”; see 
Foucault, 1972: 162-165.) My analysis, therefore, relies on the 
work of Foucault because it was Foucault who linked silence not 
with the opposite of speech or mental illness, to any case law, or 
to signs themselves, but with the rationale of government 
regarding deviant populations. By the nineteenth century, we 
entered an age, Foucault writes, “in which the flesh appears as 
the correlate of a system of power that comprises an exhaustive 
discursiveness and a surrounding silence installed around this 
obligatory and permanent confession” (Foucault, 2003: 203). 
Silence, for Foucault, is not just a withholding which presupposes 
guilt. It is indicative of a strategy that exists within a particular 
age or episteme that allows for “no obscurity, no respite” Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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(Foucault, 1990: 20). It is a war-like strategy, rather than calm, 
formal, and structured by rules (Foucault, 1980: 114). Silence, 
then, becomes part of a way of assessing guilt that is linked with 
confessions, and also with psychiatry, neurology, and the 
medical sciences in general. In the History of Sexuality, vol. I, 
Foucault shows that, because talking about sex was repressed in 
the eighteenth century, sex in the nineteenth became part of a 
discourse, a discourse that silences kinds of speech about sex 
and produces other kinds of speech. The discourse of the 
dangerous individual defines silence: silence discourses.
In viewing silence through the lens of the social and 
discursive construction of deviance and danger, I do not mean to 
suggest any absolute silence on Czolgosz’s part. Czolgosz was 
not absolutely silent. Though the tools were there, we are not 
dealing with a neurological problem, such as aphasia or mutism, 
though some doctors thought Czolgosz was an epileptic 
(Christison, 1902). To be sure, if epileptic, then insane (Spitzka, 
1973 [1887]: ch 18); if insane, then not responsible. But 
Czolgosz was never considered insane because he was deemed 
responsible, and so the discourse works backward: if Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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responsible, then not insane, then not epileptic. Czolgosz’s 
mental feebleness, apathy, and occasional stupor, any or all of 
which could have been linked with his periods of silence to form 
a judgment of mental disease (Briggs, [1983 [1921]: 299; 
Hoisholt, 1901), was never associated with any kind of known 
insanity. The murder of the innocent and righteous McKinley, 
coupled with a need for justice in the face of anarchy, swallowed 
that narrative (Buffalo Evening News, 1901).
Insofar as Czolgosz was mute, it was considered an 
elective affinity (Parker, 1901). As Dr. Carlos MacDonald wrote 
in his autopsy of Czolgosz:
We deem it an error to regard Czolgosz’s mutism in court 
when called on to plead and before his counsel as an 
attempt to simulate insanity. This conduct is in line with 
his rôle expressed in the theatrical declaration: “I am an 
Anarchist and have done my duty.” As it was his “duty” to 
slay the President, it is his duty to go to death with his lips 
sealed, and with this intent, first the plea of guilty and his 
conduct are perfectly consistent. He shows no reluctance 
to converse on matters disconnected from the crime, nor Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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even on matters connected therewith provided they do not 
touch its preparations and thus betray his associates 
(MacDonald, 1902b: 383)
MacDonald’s use of mutism in a non-neurological, indeed 
metaphorical sense, points to the medical profession’s 
unwillingness, in the face of the tragedy of McKinley’s death, to 
take seriously the possibility that Czolgosz’s silence was derived 
from a flaw in his nature (Hoisholt, 1909). Rather, his “mutism 
in court” was instantly sealed within the discourse of anarchism 
and danger. Thus, when he speaks, he invokes danger. And in 
his silence, his dangerousness is even more pronounced. Silence 
is the “element that functions alongside the things said” 
(Foucault, 1994: 27).
To be sure, an assassin’s silence could not be completely 
tolerated, by both the medical and the legal communities. The 
defense of one’s urges or behavior became a necessity because 
it was understood that the criminal has more than a corporeal 
existence; he has a linguistic substance and a narrative form 
inscribed within his body (Cole, 2001). Throughout the 
nineteenth century, criminal anthropologists, psychiatrists, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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medical doctors and sociologists were instrumental in “creating 
born criminals” out of the silence of the body: the shape of their 
heads, fingerprints, and individual background (Rafter, 1997). By 
focusing on tattoos, physical deviations, and other visible signs 
of degeneracy, nineteenth-century medical and social scientists 
created a language by which the idea of criminals, criminality, 
and deviance developed (Fink, 1962).
Czolgosz’s deed, therefore, needed to be explained not by 
a singular narrative with stable icons representing meaning, but 
through a juridical-medical discourse that criminalized behavior 
without regard for antecedent or present urges. Now, rather 
than pronounce a verdict solely within the confines of the law, 
the courts could, with the backing of the natural sciences, assert 
that Czolgosz’s silence in the face of his enormous misdeed 
made a political-economic statement that reinforced his 
depravity: the discourse of criminality is open to new discourses.
THE LAW OF SILENCE
Silence has a long tradition in the common law of being 
equated with guilt. The English legal system has had a historical 
unwillingness to sanction a defendant’s silence (Moschzisker, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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1922). From ancient times to the seventeenth century, a 
defendant’s courtroom silence (“standing mute”) was taken as a 
confession of guilt and “equivalent to a conviction” (Parker, 
1901: 85). In the event, the courts would impose bodily 
punishment to force the accused to speak, to eviscerate any 
lingering doubt regarding the defendant’s manifest guilt 
(Griswold, 1934: 657). According to William Blackstone:
The English judgement for standing mute was as follows: 
That the prisoner be remanded to the prison, from whence 
he came; and put into a low, dark chamber; and there be 
laid upon his back, on the bare floor, naked, unless where 
decency forbids. That there be placed upon his body as 
great a weight or iron as he could bear, and more; that he 
have no sustenance, save only on the first day, three 
morsels of the worst bread; and on the second day three 
draughts of standing water, that should be nearest to the 
prison door; and in this situation this should be alternately 
his daily dish till he died, or (as anciently the judgment 
ran) till he answered (Blackstone, 1875: 604).Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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At Czolgosz’s trial, the situation was not as bleak, but 
Czolgosz’s silence was not tolerated.
Mr. Penney, District Attorney: Czolgosz, have you a 
lawyer?
The prisoner shook his head, and when the question was 
repeated he gave 
a simple stare.
Mr. Penney: Czolgosz, you have been indicted for murder 
in the first 
degree. Do you want counsel to defend you? Look at me 
and answer.
The prisoner remained mute.
…
The Court: …. how do you plead?
The Prisoner: Guilty.
The Court: That plea cannot be accepted in this court. The 
clerk will enter 
a plea of not guilty, and we will proceed with the trial 
(Kansas v. Oberst, 
1929, 494).Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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Because no innocent man willfully remains silent, unless he has 
something to hide, English common-law courts from before 
Blackstone’s time to the twentieth century understood silence as 
a deliberate attempt to protect the defendant and other guilty 
parties (Chase, 1996). This view was also prevalent well into the 
nineteenth century under American law Steiner, 1899). In
Kelley v. New York, for example, the court of appeals held that 
“silence…is but an implied acquiescence in the truth of the 
statements made by others, and thus presumptive evidence of 
guilt” (1874).
Czolgosz’s silence was not taken adversely in a legal 
sense. His courtroom silence was constitutionally protected. 
Although the “right to silence” had not yet been declared part of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in New 
York, where the trial took place, “The defendant…in his silence, 
is behind the shield of the Constitution, and enjoys absolute 
protection against every species of judicial compulsion as a 
witness to self-accusation of crime” (New York v. Smith, 1914: 
544; Silvernail, 1901: 349). This was also the law throughout 
many jurisdictions at the time (Abbott, 1902: 29). The court also Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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accepted his written confession as binding (more about the 
confession below) (Silvernail, 1901: 157; New York v. Kennedy,
1899), though a written confession alone, according to New York 
law, is not sufficient to establish guilt. One must acknowledge 
one’s guilt (Silvernail, 1901: 157). Because of Czolgosz’s 
“mutism,” the court, as noted above, changed his original plea of 
“guilty” to “not guilty,” which meant that some defense of his 
actions was required. But Czolgosz did not take the stand, a 
judgment made for unknown reasons by his attorneys.
By the first quarter of the twentieth century, states either 
had protections against not taking the stand in one’s own 
defense or had liberalized the notion that silence equals guilt. 
Still, the view persisted in American courts until well into the 
1960s that a defendant’s silence could be taken to be a cover up 
for an unlawful deed. Until Griffin v. California (1965) and 
Miranda v. Arizona (1966), the former prohibiting prosecutorial 
comment on the defendant’s refusal to testify, and the latter 
establishing that inculpatory or exculpatory statements made are 
admissible only if the accused has been read his or her rights 
and that there is a right to remain silent during interrogation, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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the law allowed jurors to interpret the failure to take the stand in 
one’s own defense as a sign of guilt. As Justice Stanley Reed 
wrote, in the “search for truth,” “we see no reason why comment 
should not be made upon … silence” (Adamson v. California, 
1947: 56). Indeed, it bears emphasis that jurors’ inferences of 
guilt were not limited to the defendant’s absence from the stand; 
it was the absence of a confession that mattered – the 
defendant’s “’failure to explain or deny by his testimony any 
evidence or facts in the case against him’” allowed inferences of 
guilt (California v. Bodkin, 1961).
Because it occurred more than sixty years before Miranda, 
Czolgosz’s silence cannot easily be understood within the 
confines and contexts of the legal reasoning about silence and 
guilt that we have today. Yet Miranda is important in 
understanding silence because it disaggregated two key 
problems facing the accused and criminal defendants going back 
hundreds of years: first, Miranda removed from a jury’s 
consideration any implication of guilt because a defendant 
refused to take the stand in his own defense. Until Miranda, 
silence covered conspiracy, concepts that, by 1886, had become Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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the general characteristics of anarchists (Schaack, 1889: chaps. 
1-2). More important is the recognition that the late twentieth 
century’s criminal as silent loner is not an invention of the 
Warren Court, but has always been there, a revelation of the 
interpretive assumptions the law has allowed (Schmid, 2006).
Second, Miranda reversed the traditional interpretation of 
silence, giving it a positive content. In Justice William Douglas’s 
opinion, the Griffin decision “solemnizes the silence of the 
accused” (Griffin, 1965: 614). The law protects the defendant’s 
silence and no jury can make a negative inference of the 
defendant’s silence. Because in the past, confessions were too 
often the result of the “third degree,” the Supreme Court viewed 
the right to remain silent as a way to elevate the “esteem in 
which the administration of justice is held by the public” (Griffin, 
1965: 448) By creating an individual right to remain silent that 
imposes silence on governmental officials and jurors, and 
embedding the silence of the accused within the social prejudices 
of the post-war judicial apparatus, Miranda and Griffin removed 
the implication of guilt that was “posited as a fact” by police 
interrogators and state prosecutors (Griffin, 1965: 450). It Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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invested the accused with a right to remain silent in the face of 
his apparent guilt.
In an age that did not tolerate the silence of a criminal, 
that demanded he speak, who, in the absence of him speaking, 
was qualified to speak for Czolgosz, to explain his action? 
(Buffalo’s District Attorney played a large role here.) Once 
silence has been removed from a purely legal meaning, can the 
social and medical sciences structure the meaning of an 
assassination? Can an assassination inform the history of 
criminological theory? In the second half of this paper, I want to 
examine the construction of the McKinley assassination by 
looking less at Czolgosz himself and more at how the social and 
medical sciences at the turn of the century derived meaning out 
of Czolgosz’s silences, his words, and his body. In particular, I 
want to understand how the social and medical sciences created 
a discourse – a set of rules and practices, an articulation of the 
expectations, representations, and background of danger – out 
of the assassination that had important implications for criminal 
justice in the twentieth century.
THE BODY SPEAKSJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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To understand silence not as a negation of something but 
as something that produces “power/knowledge” within the 
human sciences, I want to turn to the discourse of the body that 
was gaining force at the time of the assassination. The emphasis 
here will be less on an abstract theory of silence than on an 
analysis of silence as power, that is, “toward a determination of 
the instruments that will make possible” the analysis of power 
that shaped the assassination (Foucault, 1990: 82). Silence, in 
other words, unmoored from a strictly legal analysis, is now 
caught in a trap. Though speech liberates the defendant from 
torture, it traps him within a medical-juridical discourse, 
whereby his silence, his speech, and his physiognomy push him 
further into guilt. This is precisely what happened to Czolgosz. 
The movement from torture, as described by Blackstone, to the 
examination of the body to establish guilt is merely tactical. By 
saying he and only he killed McKinley, for example, Czolgosz 
further justified the state’s claim that Czolgosz was rational and 
sane at the time of the assassination. By speaking, he readied 
himself for death. But his silence did the same. By the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, within the natural sciences, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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there was the idea that a reliance on codes, statutes, and laws 
to define crime was no longer necessary to determine guilt. A 
new penal system was in operation that focused more explicitly 
on the bodies of criminals to assess the possibility of danger 
(Knox, 1998).
Phrenology, the idea that the “brain is the organ of the 
mind” (Noble, 1846: 4) began to take hold of the biological 
sciences early in the nineteenth century. Phrenology sought to 
individualize the study of deviance and to locate the source of 
aberrant behavior. To be sure, as phrenology made increasingly 
larger claims about the brain, that there was a connection 
between the structure of the head and “the mind,” it turned the 
study of the head’s shape into a metaphysics for power, and 
essentialized the conditions of deviance (Brandenburg, 1901). 
For this reason, phrenology was never fully accepted by the 
medical profession, whose methods remained more empirical. 
But phrenology remained popular among amateur criminologists 
and popular novelists throughout the nineteenth century, if only 
because of the connection, further advanced by the development 
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century that the body and the mind could be broken into pieces 
and reconstituted into a whole that speaks of itself in no 
uncertain terms. With the rise of a technology to establish, 
quantify, and normalize deviance, the idea that the body could 
“speak” was linked to the forensic desires of those criminologists 
who were trained in the medical sciences, such as Cesare 
Lombroso and Alphonse Bertillon, the inventor of anthropometry. 
Anthropometry is the measurement of body parts for the 
purpose of understanding human variation. But more than mere 
measurement, Bertillon “challenged his students to truly see” the 
effects of differences among men (Matsuda, 1996: 136). Both 
Charles Guiteau, President James Garfield’s assassin, and 
Czolgosz, were phrenologized. Czolgosz was also subject to 
Bertillonage (Czolgosz Bertillon Card, 1901). But for all of its 
faulty assumptions and methodology, phrenology began the 
process for the study of crime that did not need to rely on the 
untidy methodologies of the juridical apparatus: confessions, 
witnesses, and crime scenes.
This was done, Foucault suggests, to disperse the 
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the study of crime is not the sole province of the law, but 
becomes part of the “silence of regulation” (Foucault, 2006, 21) 
that emanated from the natural sciences and the art of 
technology. A “whole new system of truth” emerges out of the 
technology of the times (Foucault, 1979: 23). By 1886, the 
photograph of a criminal’s face could speak of his crimes 
(Byrnes, 2000 [1886]). Fingerprinting, also fully in operation by 
the middle 1880s, could establish a criminal’s whereabouts as 
much as determine his innate guilt (Cole, 2001). Confessions 
were no longer the only method used to establish guilt; 
courtrooms were becoming superfluous.
The Phrenological Journal and Phrenological Magazine
described Czolgosz thus:
Taking him altogether, he has the signs of strength and 
weakness, but these are unfortunately blended in such a 
way that they do not give him the right use of his qualities 
as a normal American citizen. That he was the instrument 
of others is our firm conviction, as he has not the strength 
of mind or clearness of intellect nor the organizing ability 
of a number of other anarchists whose portraits we have Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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examined; namely, Lana, Malatissa, Emma Goldman, and 
Louise Michel (Phrenological Journal, 
1901: 133-36).
Czolgosz’s body existed to betray him. To prevent a suicide 
attempt, Czolgosz was denied access to sharp objects. In due 
course, he grew a beard, which gave him an unkempt 
appearance (New York Times, Sept. 18, 1901). The Buffalo
Commercial reported that Czolgosz looked “ten years older” than 
at the time of his arrest. The beard covered his entire face. “It 
begins high up on his cheeks and runs low on his neck. It is a 
brown beard and rather dark” (Sept. 15, 1901). Czolgosz, whose 
face had previously been described as making a “decidedly 
pleasing impression” (Chicago Daily Tribune, Sept. 9, 1901: 2), 
now appeared threatening to strangers. The beard revealed his 
inner anarchist.
Murat Halstead, McKinley’s hagiographer, described 
Czolgosz’s arms, post-mortem, as that of a “man of leisure, 
smooth, round and fair.”
His hands were not in any way notable. He had high 
insteps, neat ankles and long toes. The muscles of the legs Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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were better developed than those of the arms, indicating 
he was swift of foot. He was not noticeably spare in body; 
his chest was round and symmetrical – not lean, but the 
ribs were quite distinct….Nothing in his face or his person 
gave indication of heavy feeding or drinking, or of evil 
indulgence. There were none of the inevitable traces of 
confirmed dissipation (Halstead, 1902: 470).
At the same time that Halstead saw Czolgosz’s body as 
weak and thin, his body evoked images of classical form. 
Halstead found Czolgosz’s dead body to resemble “a recumbent 
marble statute,” like that of a “young Greek athlete – a runner of 
races at Grecian games” (ibid: 470). There was a beauty and an
innocence to Czolgosz, but Halstead knew that the analogy 
between ancient and modern bodies was false, and he was not 
fooled by Czolgosz’s Attic-looking corpse. In cleaning up 
Czolgosz following his electrocution, the medical team had 
restored Czolgosz’s body to the way it was before he became a 
murderer. The restoration, however, was a failure; the 
ornamentation was too obvious. Even in death, Czolgosz could 
not hide his true self. Halstead saw in Czolgosz’s face, beneath Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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the reconstruction, all that was missing from his first impression: 
a lack of thoughtfulness, an unnaturalness and an 
unpleasantness. In death, he betrayed his sinister side. “There 
was a plain trace of the expression of vanity, shadowy evidence 
that his grand passion was egotism” (ibid: 470).
Following the guilty verdict, Czolgosz was asked to stand 
for sentencing and to answer a few questions. His replies were 
short; his longest sentence during the inquiry was: “No sir, don’t 
drink too much” (Briggs, 1983 [1921]: 279). Czolgosz stated 
that he was twenty-eight years old, was born in Detroit, that he 
last lived in Buffalo, was single, briefly attended both common 
schools and a Catholic school, that his father was living but his 
mother was not, and that he had never been convicted of a 
crime. At that point, the questions became more complex. The 
clerk of the court asked: “Have you any legal cause to show why 
sentence of the Court should not now be pronounced against 
you?” Czolgosz replied: “I would rather have this gentleman 
speak, over here,” referring to the District Attorney, Thomas 
Penney. When Czolgosz finally spoke, he said: “I would like to 
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me; no one told me to do it and I never told anybody to do it.” 
Czolgosz made no defense of his crime, nor did he call others to 
join the revolution he apparently was so heavily invested in 
(Trial of Leon F. Czolgosz, 1901: 131-136).
The problem with a criminal’s silence is that it suggests 
that there can be deeds without meaning; that one can 
transgress without justification; that a motiveless crime can 
remain unexplained. Yet meaning must be extracted from the 
criminal, else the trial and judgment be seen as motivated by 
revenge and not justice. At autopsy, Czolgosz’s body revealed no 
markings of degeneration. His skull was “symmetrical, his ears 
do not protrude, nor are they of abnormal size, and his palate 
not highly arched. Psychically he has not a history of cruelty, or 
of perverted tastes and habits.” But, because he was an 
assassin, and the assassination made no logical sense, he was 
“the product of Anarchy, sane and responsible” (MacDonald, 
1902b: 381).
It is the McKinley assassination, then, that began the 
process of unearthing silence and locating it within power’s 
grasp. But rather than revealing the state’s new power over the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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individual as an institutional force, medical and legal experts, 
speaking in the formalized language of motives and the 
importance of confession contained its meaning within the 
boundaries of crime, punishment, responsibility and sanity.
THE CONFESSIONS
Though the assassination occurred at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, we are not far from Foucault’s medieval 
madman, whose words “were either totally ignored or else were 
taken as words of truth” (Foucault, 1972: 217). When Czolgosz 
said he killed McKinley because he was “the enemy of the 
working people,” this was taken as the truth of Czolgosz’s 
intentions. But when he quit work at the age of twenty-four 
complaining of ill health, or ate alone though his family was 
home, or read the newspaper away from others in a crowded 
tavern, or slept under a tree during the day rather than work, or 
used aliases, or lied about his religion, or was curt with his 
stepmother, he was not understood to be mentally or physically 
ill but thinking about strikes, revolution, and assassinations, or 
simply thought of as willfully strange, weak, and a coward. When 
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secret clubs, he was assumed to be a spy. When he remained 
silent in court, he was taken to be a conspirator. When he said 
he acted alone, there was disbelief.
The need for a confession was obvious. It satisfied the 
authorities that they had the right killer; it proved his sanity and 
established his responsibility. But Czolgosz’s “confessions” 
proved elusive. They were edited and altered to suit the needs of 
what Czolgosz was thought to represent. The New York Times, 
for instance, published lengthy excerpts from what seems to be 
the official confession (New York Times, Sept. 8, 1901). But the 
Times made no attempt to sort out the contradictions of the 
assassin’s story. The Times’s version begins with two obvious 
inaccuracies. One has Czolgosz saying his parents were “Russian 
Poles,” and the other has them arriving in the United States in 
1859 (his parents were Polish and they arrived between 1871-
73). Moreover, in that confession, Czolgosz was made to sound 
as if he was part of a conspiracy, noting anarchist friends as far 
west as Chicago. But Czolgosz had no anarchist friends in any 
part of the country. Nowhere, except for in the Times article, had 
Czolgosz said he was “bitter.” Yet, according to the Times, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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Czolgosz said, “I became more or less bitter. Yes, I know I was 
bitter. I never had much luck at anything, and this preyed upon 
me. It made me morose and envious, but what started the craze 
to kill was a lecture I heard some little time ago by Emma 
Goldman. She was in Cleveland [in May, 1901], and I and other 
Anarchists went to hear her. She set me on fire” (New York 
Times, Sept. 8, 1901). Apart from the problems this confession 
created for Goldman, “morose and envious” seem beyond 
Czolgosz’s usual vocabulary, and it is worth questioning how 
much of this confession was put together, either by journalists or 
by government officials, as happened with the confessions 
Czolgosz gave at police headquarters.
This is the meaning of the trial against Leon Czolgosz. 
Though it lasted only two days, eight hours total, it assembled 
these disparate discourses without uniting them, subjecting 
Czolgosz to multiple narratives that reached his guilt by 
association, and not by what he said.
Czolgosz’s fullest confession, given over three days while 
in custody immediately following the assassination, has been 
written about but never revealed, until now. According to the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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Buffalo Evening News, “Czolgosz’s confession made to the 
District Attorney is held sacredly as an official secret, and no 
other connected statement of any kind has been made” by 
Czolgosz (Sept. 9, 1901a). In November 1907, the police 
headquarters in Buffalo, where the original confession had been 
housed, burned down, along with the confession (New York 
Times, Nov. 2, 1901).
Despite the hermetically sealed incarceration of Czolgosz 
(Buffalo Evening News, Sept. 14, 1901), the press got word of a 
confession. The New York Times published excerpts from the 
confession two days after the assassination and other 
newspapers followed the Times’s lead. Various parts of the 
confession were then leaked to the press and subsequently 
conflated as one confession with an assortment of 
contradictions, creating an assassin who was simultaneously 
committed to revolutionary anarchism and sorry about his deed. 
Just three days after the assassination, the Buffalo Evening News
was forced to admit that “all alleged statements and confessions 
from the President’s would-be assassin are manufactured ones … 
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have been picked up by police and government officials who 
have talked informally with him” (Sept. 9, 1901b).  Yet the 
existence of multiple confessions (however distorted) allowed 
the press to turn Czolgosz into a many-headed hydra of danger.
Recently, I (with the help of Craig Gable on the Senate 
Documents confession) discovered three previously unknown 
confessions, one taken on September 8 (discovered in the 
National Archives), and two taken on September 6, his first day 
of captivity (from Senate Documents). I will call the first 
confession from September 6
th the O’Laughlin confession, after 
the officer named in the confession. The second confession on 
the 6th, I will call Penney confession, after the District Attorney 
who led the interrogation. I will call the third confession the 
Archives confession, which is where I discovered it, part of a 
microfilm series on FBI surveillance of anarchists at the National 
Archives and Records Administration. In the Archives confession, 
there are no names attached, no signatures at the bottom, but 
some handwriting appears in the margins.
The O’Laughlin confession is a bizarre mixture of first- and 
third-person narrative. It begins: “Fred Nieman [a Czolgosz Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
136
alias] says he has been in Buffalo a week to-morrow, September 
7, 1901.” The next sentence reads: “I came from Cleveland, 
Ohio” (Investigative Activities, 1919: 62). There are also 
instances where either Czolgosz is rambling or the transcriber 
put in what he or she wanted to (“Never was in Buffalo before 
this year,” one sentence reads. And the next reads: “I was in 
Buffalo about a year ago.”) Most of the confession restates what 
is already known of Czolgosz’s whereabouts from newspaper 
accounts, his strained relationship with his stepmother, and his 
misunderstanding of Emma Goldman’s theory of violence and 
anarchism. There is not much that is new, except for yet another 
reason for killing McKinley: “I wanted to do it.” The two-page 
confession ends with the remark that the rest of the statement is 
missing (ibid: 64).
The Penney confession is also a mixture of new and old 
information. This confession, however, unlike others, is in the 
style of a Q & A. Overall, this is a reproduction of the first day’s 
interrogation and it clearly says things differently than the way 
the press reported. Czolgosz’s answers were short, confused, 
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allowed him to write his own statement, he refused. He did, 
however, agree to what the reporter wrote down.
There are two new facts in this interview. One is that 
Czolgosz says that he went to Buffalo “To strike something to 
do,” which was taken to mean he was looking for work (ibid: 
65). Not only until this point, but ever since, no one has 
attributed Czolgosz’s move to Buffalo as a search for 
employment. It has always been associated with an intent to kill. 
Another new fact is that, unlike the confession taken by 
O’Laughlin, in this interview, Czolgosz never clearly stated when 
he got the idea to kill McKinley. At times (seemingly under 
pressure from the D.A.), he said that he thought to kill McKinley 
three to four days ago; sometimes he says two to three days 
ago; and once he said that he had no intent to kill the president 
when he arrived in Buffalo (ibid: 67). There is no attempt to 
clear up these discrepancies. Penney, however, got Czolgosz to 
admit that he thought to kill McKinley when he bought a 
revolver, which was at least three days before killing McKinley, 
and proof that the assassination was the product of a sane and 
rational criminal mind (New York v. Schmidt, 1901).Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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There are two points of interest in this interview, linked by 
one important aim: Penney needed to get Czolgosz to draw a 
clear line between insanity and willful criminality, between acting 
on irrational desires and acting illicitly. Penney achieved this 
without much effort. The first point of interest is how easily the 
interrogators got Czolgosz to admit that his intention to kill the 
president was not a spur of the moment idea, and the other was 
how they led Czolgosz to admit that he killed McKinley to 
sacrifice himself to a cause he believed in, despite the fact that 
in this interview Czolgosz revealed that he knew little of 
anarchism and that he only became an anarchist no longer than 
a year before he killed McKinley (Investigative Activities, 1919: 
67). The key words they got from Czolgosz are “sacrifice” and 
“courage.” “You were willing to sacrifice yourself to benefit the 
country?” “Yes, sir.” And: “Few men would have the courage to 
do anything of that kind?” “Yes, sir” (ibid: 69). Czolgosz was now 
a revolutionary.
Having established Czolgosz’s rationality and dedication to 
a cause, all Penney needed to do to close the interview was to 
get Czolgosz to admit he knew what he was doing. Czolgosz did Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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not like the statement “I was willing to take the chance of being 
electrocuted or hung,” so he asked that it be changed. Penney 
then said: “It is not a question whether it is what you want; it is 
a question whether it was right.” Czolgosz: “I knew --.” Penney: 
“You knew if you killed a man you would be hung or 
electrocuted…” Czolgosz: “I know the law does that” (ibid: 72). 
This is an acknowledgment only that Czolgosz understood the 
functioning of the law. Penney took it to mean that Czolgosz 
knew the difference between right and wrong, a critical test that 
establishes a defendant’s sanity and capacity to stand trial. 
Clearly, Penney was not interested in fine-tuning Czolgosz’s 
confession according to the McNaughtan rules (New York v. 
Ferraro, 1900). He wanted Czolgosz, however broadly, to 
acknowledge that he understood the consequences of his action.
There is no introduction or commentary attached to the 
Archives confession. The confession is typed, though there are 
handwritten notes all over the one-page document. At the top of 
the page, beneath the ominous words: “I am not alone; I did my 
duty,” the document states: “Confession of Leon Czolgosz.” The 
confession was not signed by Czolgosz or by any Buffalo official, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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though hand-written names (either prison officials or the 
stenographer) appear in both the left- and right-hand corners. A 
hand-written “Sunday Sept. 8 1901” appears in the right-hand 
corner.
The first words of the confession are: “I am not alone; I 
did my duty.” Czolgosz next admits to being an anarchist and to 
having been inspired by Emma Goldman, who – Czolgosz 
incorrectly says – he met in New York (all other connections 
between Czolgosz and Goldman place their meeting in Cleveland, 
including from Goldman herself; Goldman 1977: 289-90, 296), 
that any man who “accepts the presidency is a foe to the 
common people.” “I did my duty,” Czolgosz repeats. “I am sorry 
that Mr. M’Kinley has suffered. I intended to kill him and I regret 
that I did not succeed.” Czolgosz also suggested that he was 
part of a conspiracy, or at least, part of a giant movement of the 
disgruntled. “I am not alone in this work. I am only one of the 
great body of anarchists bound together under solemn oath to 
accomplish a work and to bring about the results that surely 
must come.”Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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Finally, Czolgosz stated that he was not sorry for what he 
had done. “Why should I be? I have been simply an agent in the 
accomplishment of a work, which, I hope, will succeed.” He 
acknowledged that the government will punish him and that “the 
great majority” cannot appreciate his deed. “I shall be 
denounced, and I will be punished,” Czolgosz declared, strangely 
using perfect syntax, “but I will take my punishment, no matter 
in what form it may come, like a man” (Investigative Reports, 
1908-1922).
These confessions present Czolgosz as a dedicated 
revolutionary and courageous in the face of death. But this is not 
how all the members of the press portrayed him. The Buffalo 
Express was the first to publish the idea that Czolgosz was sorry 
for his crime. The paper printed a confession Czolgosz made 
while in transit between Buffalo and the Auburn prison in New 
York, and it contained an apology for killing McKinley (Sept. 27, 
1901). The common perception is that Czolgosz was an 
unrepentant anarchist who had “done his duty” as an anarchist 
and was angry at McKinley for harming the working classes, 
although there are serious grounds for treating these attributions Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
142
with suspicion (Briggs 1983 [1921]: 337). According to the 
Buffalo Express, Czolgosz said, “It is an awful thing to feel you 
killed someone….I wish I was my same old person again….My 
mind was stirred up and I don’t know what was in it or what 
influenced it.” He then extended an apology: “I wish the people 
to know I am sorry for what I did. It was a mistake and it was 
wrong. If I had to do it over again I never would do it. But it is 
too late now to talk of that. I am sorry I killed the President” 
(Sept. 27, 1901).
No writer on the assassination, past or present, equates 
McKinley’s assassination with a job seeking or remorseful 
Czolgosz, only a frustrated anarchist concerned with the broad 
outlines of domestic policy. The reason, I believe, is that neither 
job seeking nor remorse can be linked with the discourse of 
dangerousness that the press and the medical and legal 
professions had so heavily invested in. To be sure, a stray truth 
may escape in a newspaper article, but the confessions reveal 
their importance – certainly not in the sense of establishing 
Czolgosz’s manner of thinking. Rather, they bring to light the 
“ritual that unfolds within a power relationship” (Foucault, 1990: Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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61); the power behind the truth that Czolgosz was a dangerous 
anarchist assassin.
CONCLUSION
We have, in the Czolgosz trial, the perfect encapsulation of 
the birth of the criminal subject through various techniques “for 
constituting individuals as correlative elements of power and 
knowledge” (Foucault, 1979: 194). In Czolgosz’s silence, his 
speech, and within his body, there is Czolgosz the European 
anarchist and revolutionary who can ignite the masses with his 
speeches. In the various confessions, there is Czolgosz the 
anarchist caught in the thrall of Emma Goldman’s speeches, and 
the one attracted to assassination by anarchist periodicals and 
the deeds of European anarchists. There is also the regretful and 
proud assassin. How to understand the contradictions?
By the end of the nineteenth century, the criminal was no 
longer an incidental facet of the legal system. He could be 
identified, measured, and assessed along a grid of 
dangerousness. Modern criminology names the subject. The 
criminal exists only to be betrayed.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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A criminal in a state of liberty commits a crime. It is the 
duty of the police to draw up his descriptive signalment by 
means of all the observations which they can produce, that 
they may be able to recognize him amid the multitude of 
human beings and arrest him. As soon as a suspected 
person has been arrested, the anthropometrical signalment 
intervenes to establish his identity…. Anthropometrical 
signalment makes it possible, and it is the only kind that 
does so, being given a subject to find his name. It goes 
back into the past and provides against the future 
(Bertillon, 1896, 64; italics added).
By 1901, the knowledge of the criminal the state possessed was 
tied not to one method of examination, the McNaughtan test of 
right and wrong, created by the House of Lords in 1843, 
following the failed assassination attempt on the prime minister 
by Daniel McNaughtan, but to an assemblage of discourses, 
taken from the disciplines most concerned with the body and the 
mind of the criminal, as well as from the subject’s affiliations, 
acquaintances, and associations, constituting not one narrative 
of criminality or of deviance, but several, contained within the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
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discourse of dangerousness that had broken free from the law’s 
formalism. It was therefore irrelevant whether Czolgosz was 
actually ill or what he really said or if he remained silent. He was 
too embedded within this discourse for any medical discovery to 
change the meaning of events.
The McKinley assassination was a watershed event. There 
is key difference between Czolgosz and the assassins and 
criminals who preceded him, principally Guiteau. It is the 
difference between the criminology of the twentieth century that 
focused on the body and its discourse, and the jurisprudence of 
the nineteenth, that determined guilt by law, by formal rules.
With Czolgosz, the criminal is now a derangement of nature with 
no symptoms other than the act itself. Anarchism, then, became 
a crime not in 1886, with the trial of the Haymarket rioters, who 
had fought back against police violence, but in 1901, when 
Czolgosz declared it was his duty to kill McKinley because of the 
state of affairs. From that point on, law and the social and 
medical sciences dedicated themselves to examining the 
“pathology of the monstrous” (Foucault, 1988: 131), having 
created for themselves not an independent realm of knowledge, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
146
carved out of anatomy or biology, but a modality of power within 
the larger discourse of the Gilded Age.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
147
References
Abbott, Austin. A Brief for the Trial of Criminal Cases. Rochester, 
New York. 1902.
Bastian, H.C. A Treatise on Aphasia and other Speech Defects. 
London: H.K. Lewis. 1898.
Bertillon, Alphonse. Signaletic Instructions. Chicago: The Werner 
Company. 1896.
Bonger, Willem. Criminality and Economic Conditions. Translated 
by Henry Horton. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 
1916.
Briggs, Lloyd. The Manner of Man that Kills. New York: DaCapo 
Press. 1983 [1921].
Brooks, Peter. “The Law as Narrative and Rhetoric,” Law’s 
Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, Peter Brooks 
and Paul Gewirtz, eds. New Haven: The Yale University 
Press. 1996.
----------. Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and 
Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2000.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
148
Blackstone, William. Commentaries on the Laws of England. Vol. 
II. Albany: John D. Parsons, Jr. Law Book Publisher. 1875.
Bonger, Willem. Criminality and Economic Conditions. Translated 
by Henry Horton. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 
1916.
Buffalo Commercial. “He can’t sleep.” Sept. 15, 1901. 
http://ublib.buffalo.edu/libraries/exhibits/panam/law/czolg
osz.html
Brandenburg, Broughton, “Czolgosz’s Cranial and Facial 
Characteristics,” Buffalo Courier. November 17, 1901.
Buffalo Evening News. “Czolgosz Insists that He Alone is 
Responsible.” 42(128) Sept. 9, 1901a: 7?
Buffalo Evening News. “Czolgosz’s Confessions Manufactured.” 
42(128) (Sept. 9, 1901b: 7?
Buffalo Evening News. “Assassin Still Confined in the Police 
Dungeon.” 42(133) Sept. 14, 1901.
Buffalo Evening News. “Would Bury Czolgosz in the Deep Sea.” 
42(147) (Oct 3, 1901).Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
149
Buffalo Express. “Regrets His Crime.” Sept. 27, 1901. 
http://ublib.buffalo.edu/libraries/exhibits/panam/law/trial/
regret.html
Byrnes, Thomas. Professional Criminals of America. New York: 
The Lyons Press. 2000 [1886].
Chase, Carol. “Hearing the ‘Sounds of Silence’ in Criminal Trials: 
A Look at Recent British Law Reforms with an Eye Toward 
Reforming the American Criminal Justice System.” 
University of Kansas Law Review, 44: 929: 949. 1996.
Chicago Daily Tribune. “Dr Moyer, Alienist, Thinks Czolgosz 
Sane: No Mental Defect or Degeneracy in Face,” 60(252): 
pt. 1: 2. September 9, 1901.
Christison, John S. “Epilepsy, Responsibility and the Czolgosz 
Case: Was the Assassin Sane or Insane?” Kansas City 
Medical Index-Lancet, 23(1) 1902: 10-17.
Cole, Simon. Suspect Identities: A History of Fingerprinting and 
Criminal Identification. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 2001.
Collins, Joseph. “Aphasia,” in Modern Medicine, William Osler, 
ed. Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger. 1910.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
150
Conley, John. Just Words: Law, Language, and Power. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 2005.
Czolgosz Bertillon Card. Buffalo and Erie County Historical 
Society Archives, A90-4. 1901, 
http://mckinleydeath.com/documents/govdocs/bertillon.ht
m (accessed May 27, 2010).
Fink, Arthur. Causes of Crime: Biological Theories in the United 
States, 1800-1915. New York: A. S. Barnes & Company. 
1962.
Foucault, Michel. The Archeology of Knowledge and the 
Discourse on Language. Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith. New 
York: Pantheon Books. 1972.
-------. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated 
by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books. 1979.
----------. Power/Knowledge: Selective Interviews & Other 
Writings, 1972-1977, Colin Gordon, ed. New York: 
Pantheon Books. 1980.
--------.“The Dangerous Individual,” Politics, Philosophy, Culture: 
Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984. Lawrence 
Kritzman, ed. London: Routledge: 125-151. 1988.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
151
----------. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction: Volume I. 
Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books. 
1990.
----------. The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Human 
Sciences. New York: Vintage Books. 1994.
----------. Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France, 1974-
1975. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Picador. 
2003.
----------. Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College de France, 
1973-1974. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: 
Palgrave. 2006.
Goldman, Emma. Living My Life. Drinnon, R. and Drinnon, A. 
(eds.) New York: New American Library. 1977.
Greer, Steven. “The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current 
Debate.” Modern Law Review 53(6): 709-730. 1990.
Griswold, Erwin. “The Historical Development of Waiver of Jury 
Trial in Criminal Cases.” Virginia Law Review 20(6): 655-
669. 1934. 
Halstead, Murat. The Illustrious Life of William McKinley, Our 
Martyred President. 1902. No publisher.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
152
Hoisholt, A.W. “Simulations of Insanity,” Transactions of the 
Medical Society of the State of California, 31: 5-35. 1901.
----------. “Current Ideas on Aphasia,” Archives of Internal 
Medicine, 3: 451-466. 1909.
Investigative Activities of the Department of Justice. (1919; May 
19-Nov. 19).
66
th Congress, 1
st session (U.S. Senate, vol. 12). 
http://books.google.com/books?id=SGhUAAAAIAAJ&pg=P
A73&dq=fred+nieman&lr=&as_drrb_is=b&as_minm_is=0&
as_miny_is=1901&as_maxm_is=0&as_maxy_is=1922&nu
m=100&as_brr=1#v=onepage&q=fred%20nieman&f=fals
e.
Investigative Reports. 1908-1922. Investigative Reports of the 
Bureau of
Investigation. M1085. National Archives Record 
Administration. Series: Old German Files, 1901-1921. Roll 
Number 831.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
153
Knox, Sara. Murder: A Tale of Modern American Life. Durham: 
Duke University Press. 1998.
Langbein, John. Torture and the Law of Proof: Europe and 
England in the Ancien Regime. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 2006.
Leps, Marie-Christine. Apprehending the Criminal: The 
Production of Deviance in Nineteenth-Century Discourse. 
Durham: Duke University Press. 1992.
Lessa, Lara. “Discursive Struggles within Social Welfare: 
Restaging Teen Motherhood.” British Journal of Social 
Work, 36 (2006): 283-298.
Lombroso, Cesare. “Physiognomy of Anarchists,” Two parts. 
Originally appeared in The Monist, no. 1, 1891.
www.spunk.org/library/humour/sp001494/physiog.html. 
MacDonald, Arthur. A Plan for the Study of Man: With Reference 
to Bills to Establish a Laboratory for the Study of the 
Criminal, Pauper, and Defective Classes, with a 
Bibliography of Child Study. Washington: Government 
Printing Office. 1902a.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
154
MacDonald, Carlos F. “The Trial, Execution, Autopsy and Mental 
Status of Leon F. Czolgosz, Alias Fred Nieman, the 
Assassin of President McKinley.” American Journal of 
Insanity, 58(3): 369-86. 1902b.
Matsuda, Matt. The Memory of the Modern. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 1996.
Milovanovic, Dragan. “Diversity, Law and Justice: A Deleuzian 
Semiotic view of ‘Criminal Justice,’” International Journal 
for the Semiotics of Law, 20(1): 55-79. 2007.
Moschzisker, Robert von. “The Historic Origin of Trial by Jury: 
II.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American 
Law Register, 70(2): 73-86. 1922.
Moore, Nathan. “Icons of Control,” International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law, 20(1): 33-54. 2007.
New York Times. “The Assassin Makes a Full Confession.” Sept. 
8, 1901: 1.
New York Times. “Assassin Czolgosz refuses to plead.” Sept. 18, 
1901: 3.
New York Times. “Burns out Buffalo Police.” Nov. 2, 1901: 1.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
155
Noble, Daniel. The Brain and its Physiology. London: John 
Churchill. 1846.
Parker, LeRoy. “The Trial of the Anarchist Murderer Czolgosz.” 
The Yale Law Journal, 11(2): 80-94. 1901.
Peterson, F. and Haines, W. A Text-book of Legal Medicine and 
Toxicology. Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders & Company. 
1903. Two volumes.
Phrenological Journal and Phrenological Magazine. “Recent 
Events.” 112(4): 133-136. Oct. 1901.
Pick, Daniel. Faces of Degeneration: A European Disorder, c. 
1848-1919. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989.
Rafter, Nicole. Creating Born Criminals. Urbana: The University 
of Illinois Press. 1997.
Report of the Trial of Abraham Prescott, for the Murder of Mrs. 
Sally Cochran.  Manchester, New Hampshire: Daily Mirror 
Office. 1869.
Saldana, Quintiliano. “The New Criminal Anthropology.” Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology 24(1) (1933): 333-350.Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
156
Schaack, Michael. Anarchy and Anarchists: A History of the Red 
Terror and the Social Revolution in American and Europe.
Chicago: F.J. Schulte & Company. 1889.
Schmid, David. Natural Born Celebrities: Serial Killers in 
American Culture
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2006.
Silvernail, W., Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure of the 
State of New York. Albany: New York: W.C. Little & Co. 
Law Publishers. 1901.
Spitzka, Edward C. Insanity: Its Classification, Diagnosis and 
Treatment. New York: Arno Press. 1973 [1887].
Steiner, Bernard. “The Adoption of English Law in Maryland.” 
Yale Law Journal, 8(8): 353-361. 1899.
Tappan, Paul. “Who is the Criminal?” American Sociological 
Review, 12(1):96-102. 1947.
Tiersma, Peter. Legal Language. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 2000.
Trial of Leon F. Czolgosz. 1901. 
http://mckinleydeath.com/documents/govdocs/transcript.h
tmJournal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology    Felderman
Vol. 2 (2) 100-157 A Morphological Sphinx
157
Wegner, Ann. “Mapping Legal Semiotics,” International Journal 
for the Semiotics of Law, 23(1): 77-82.
Cases Cited:
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46. 1947.
California v. Bodkin, 196 Cal.App.2d 412, 423. 1961.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609. 1965.
Kansas v. Oberst, 127 Kan. 412, 1929.
Kelley v. New York, 2 Cow.Cr.Rep. 30. 1874.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 1966.
New York v. Ferraro, 15 E.H. Smith. 365. 1900.
New York v. Kennedy, 13 E.H. Smith 346. 1899.
New York v. Schmidt, 6 Bedell 568. 1901.
New York v. Smith, 84 Misc. 348. 1914.